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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is properly before the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(a) and § 63-46b-16 following final action by the Utah Labor Commission. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
(Appellees reframe the issues raised by Appellant to render them more understandable.) 
I. Whether the Labor Commission erred in its determination that the 
Appellant does not suffer from post traumatic stress disorder or mental disability as a 
result of the December 15, 1993 work-related incident. 
The Commission's finding can be overturned only if not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record. The Appellant must marshal all the 
evidence and then demonstrate, despite this evidence, that the Commission's findings are 
so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g), §34A-2-601(2)(e) (1997) and §34A-l-303(2)(c)(ii). See also 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Board of Review, 839 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1992) and 
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989). 
II. Whether the Labor Commission erred in concluding that even if Appellant 
did suffer an injury that it did not result in any impairment or disability from work. 
The Commission's findings can be overturned only if not supported by substantial 
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evidence when viewed in light of the whole record. The Appellant must marshal all the 
evidence and then demonstrate, despite this evidence, that the Commission's findings are 
so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g), §34A-2-601(2)(e) and §34A-l-303(2)(c)(ii). See also 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Board of Review, supra, and Grace Drilling Co. v. 
Board of Review, supra. 
III. Whether the ALJ or Labor Commission is bound by the findings and 
conclusions of the medical panel. 
This is an issue of law. The correction of error standard is followed with no 
deference accorded to the Labor Commission. See Brown & Root Indus. Service v. 
Industrial Com n of Utah, 947 P.2d 671 (Utah 1997). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601(2)(e) (1997) and Utah Code Ann 
§ 34A-l-303(2)(c)(ii) (1997) render the decision of the Appeals Board the final order of 
the Labor Commission. Because the 1997 provisions are procedural, they are retroactive 
and apply to the facts in this case which arose in December 1993. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16(4)(g) sets forth the standard of review and reversal. (See these provisions 
contained in addendum.) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a workers' compensation action filed by the Appellant on December 11, 
1995. She claims that as a result of an incident on December 13, 1993, while working as 
a respiratory therapist, she improperly connected an oxygen line rupturing the lung of a 
patient who died six weeks later. (R.l, 257, pp. 11-13). Appellant claims as a result of 
this incident she has suffered post-traumatic stress disorder entitling her to medical 
expenses, temporary total disability, temporary partial disability and travel expenses 
(R.l), although she has been employed continuously since the incident. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition. 
The hearing in this case took place before the administrative law judge (ALJ) on 
October 9, 1996. The medical panel, with the benefit of the reports of Dr. David 
McCann, a psychiatrist, Dr. Gary DeVries, a psychologist, and Dr. Robert Card, a 
psychologist, rendered its opinion on September 18, 1997. 
The ALJ issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on March 25, 
1998, denying the Appellant's claims. (See Addendum, Exhibit B). 
Appellant filed a Motion for Review on April 24, 1998, and the Labor 
Commission Appeals Board affirmed the ALJ's denial of benefits on September 1, 1998, 
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concluding that the Appellant suffered no injury on December 15, 1993, which rendered 
her incapable of working. (See Addendum, Exhibit A). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The instant case is a workers' compensation action brought by Tenne Straub (fka 
Vanderwood), the Appellant, alleging that on or about December 15, 1993, while 
involved in rendering respiratory therapy at McKay-Dee Hospital that she improperly 
connected an oxygen line which resulted in a rupture of the lung of a patient and the 
patient's death six weeks later. (R. 257, pg. 11-13) 
The Appellant claims as a result of this she has suffered mental injury or post-
traumatic stress disorder, constituting an industrial injury and that she is entitled to 
medical expenses, temporary total disability compensation, temporary partial disability 
compensation, and travel expenses.(R.l). 
Prior to this incident, the Appellant was having domestic problems with her 
husband (this was her third marriage) and sought counseling with psychologist, Dr. Gary 
DeVries, and saw him on at least six occasions. (R. 257, pg.59 ). From 1991 to 1993, 
she also took the antidepressant drug, Prozac. (R.126, pg. 48 ). 
The day following the December 15, 1993, incident at work, the Appellant and 
her husband had a disagreement, and she started throwing his clothes out of the house. 
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While doing this, she picked up a loaded .357 magnum pistol and fired it at him. (R. 257, 
pg. 19). Subsequently, she separated from her husband. (R. 257, pg. 21). In January 
1994, Appellant's husband claimed that she hit him with a branding iron. As a result of 
this incident and the pistol firing incident, the Appellant was charged with felonies. (R. 
257, pg 20). She was ultimately sentenced to 30 days in the Weber County Jail which 
she served from July 5, 1994, to August, 1994. (R. 257, pg. 41). In October 1994, the 
Appellant and her husband were divorced. (R. 257, pg. 17-19). The Appellant testified 
that in connection with the divorce she attended court on nine or ten occasions. (R. 305). 
While the Appellant was incarcerated in 1994, she was allowed to work during the 
day. She trained horses eight hours per day during this period of time for which she was 
paid. (R. 257, pg. 47). She preferred not to work at the hospital during her incarceration 
because she did not feel comfortable performing professional work while in jail. 
(Addendum, Exhibit C, pg 2). After being released from jail, the Appellant continued to 
work as a respiratory therapist at McKay-Dee Hospital until August 28, 1994. (R.257, 
pg. 43-45). On August 28, 1994, she voluntarily terminated her employment unrelated 
to the December 15, 1993, incident. (R. 257, pg. 53). She received a severance package 
that continued her full salary through December 28, 1994. (R. 257, pg. 43). 
After the December 15, 1993, incident, the Appellant visited Dr. Gary DeVries for 
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counseling on several occasions (R. 257, pg 38-39), but according to Dr. DeVries on 
only one occasion did she ever mention the December 15, 1993, incident as being a 
cause of her stress. On all other occasions she spoke about her divorce, her fear of 
incarceration and other issues. Dr. DeVries concluded that there was nothing which 
prevented her from working. (R. 148-149). 
The Appellant worked continuously without interruption as a respiratory therapist 
from December 15, 1993, until the time of her incarceration, starting on July 5, 1994. (R. 
257, pg 41). While incarcerated she worked full time, 40 hours per week, training horses 
while on work release from July 5, 1994, to August 4, 1994. After her release, she 
returned to McKay-Dee Hospital as a respiratory therapist until August 28, 1994, when 
she voluntarily terminated and received salary continuation. (R. 257, pg. 43, 47). 
After terminating employment with McKay-Dee Hospital, she trained horses and 
gave riding lessons 40 hours per week for which she was paid $10 to $15 per hour until 
July 1995. In July 1995, her father suffered a heart attack, and she worked on his ranch 
in Arizona for room and board at $600 a month until November, 1995, when she 
returned to Logan. (R. 257, pg. 46-48). She suffered significant stress from working 
with her father who was very critical of her. (R. 253). 
The Appellant applied for positions as a respiratory therapist on three occasions 
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after she voluntarily terminated her employment at the hospital in August, 1994. (R. 
257, pg. 49, 50, 52). The last time she applied for a respiratory therapist position was 
March, 1996. (R. 252, pg. 52). 
The Appellant's respiratory therapy license was suspended as a result of the 
December 15, 1994, incident and was not reinstated until February, 1996. (R. 257, pg. 
58; R. 349, pg 50). It then expired for failure to pay renewal fees on September 30, 
1996. Therefore, she could not be employed as a respiratory therapist after September 
30, 1996. (R. 349). 
The Appellant applied for numerous jobs in 1995 and 1996 up to the time of the 
administrative hearing in October 1996. (R. 257, pg 48-51). She testified at the time of 
the hearing she had a "folder full of jobs" she had applied for. (R. 257, pg. 52). She told 
Dr. McCann in 1996 she passed out 35 copies of her resume to prospective employers. 
(R. 234). Mrs. Straub was a student at Bridger Applied Technology Center between 
March and May, 1996. (R. 257, pg. 17). 
Prior to the October, 1996, hearing, Dr. Gary DeVries, her psychologist, and Dr. 
David McCann, a psychiatrist who examined her and performed substantial 
psychological testing, opined that she was capable of working as a respiratory therapist. 
(R. 149, 254). Dr. Burgoyne, the medical panel psychiatrist, also determined the patient 
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was not disabled from working at the time of the examination in September, 1997, and in 
any event had worked almost continuously since the alleged incident in December 1993. 
(R. 289). 
With regard to earnings, in 1993 Appellant's tax return indicated that she earned 
$33,000 in 1993. In 1994, subtracting the difference for reduced earnings for being 
jailed for one month, she earned approximately the same amount of money. (R. 305). In 
1995 she received $67,000 from the sale of the family home. (R. 257, pg. 68-69). There 
is no evidence in the form of tax returns in the record of any wage loss in 1996 or 1997 
presented to the ALJ or presented at any other time. It appears for the first time on 
page 3 of Appellant's Motion for Review. (R. 312). 
The first notice of the Appellant's claim was December 11, 1995, when she filed 
her application for hearing. No notice or report claiming an industrial accident was 
given to the employer by the Appellant before that date. 
The hearing before the ALJ took place on October 9, 1996. In conjunction with 
this hearing, Dr. David L. McCann, a psychiatrist, performed an exhaustive examination 
and evaluation of the Appellant. He conducted several tests (R. 220) and noted that the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—2 revealed an extreme pattern for over 
endorsement on all items. (R. 253). He also noticed that Appellant's condition 
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deteriorated after living on her father's ranch in 1995 due to her conflicts with him. (R. 
253). Dr. McCann concluded that the Appellant was not suffering from post traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), although she did have depression. He also concluded there was 
no causal connection between her depression and the December 15, 1993 incident and 
that she was able to work. (R. 253-254) Dr. McCann noted the Appellant only 
concluded that she could not work when she had trouble finding work in 1995. (R. 254). 
Dr. Robert Burgoyne, the medical panel psychiatrist, concluded that the Appellant 
was not disabled as a result of the PTSD and that Appellant's problems were not 
permanent. (R. 289). The panel further concluded that the period during which the 
Appellant's ability to work was affected was December 15, 1993 through March, 1996, 
even though Appellant had worked all of this time. (R. 283). 
The ALJ rejected the conclusion of the panel that Appellant was temporarily 
partially disabled until March 1996, because it was not supported by the law and the 
evidence. He also concluded that there was no evidence to support a finding of 
temporary total disability or temporary partial disability. (R. 305). The fact that 
Appellant worked more overtime after the December 15, 1993, incident at the hospital, 
that she continued to work without pause after this date, as well as the reports of Dr. 
McCann and the Affidavit of Dr. DeVries were convincing to the ALJ. (R. 305, 307). 
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The ALJ noted that the Appellant may have suffered mental problems, but 
concluded as did Dr. McCann that her problems occurred well after the December 15, 
1993, incident and were due to her serving a jail sentence, family problems, divorce, her 
daughter's learning disabilities, sexual difficulties, business and career adjustments, the 
treatment of her by her parents and relatives, her father's heart attack and preexisting 
problems, not the industrial event. (R. 305). The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and the Order of the ALJ issued on March 25, 1998 concluded (1) the Appellant suffered 
no temporary total disability, and (2) the Appellant suffered no reduction in the number 
of hours or the amount of exertion necessary to be employed thereby, ruling out a finding 
of temporary partial disability. (R. 307). (See Exhibit "B" contained in Addendum). 
The Appellant appealed the ALJ's order to the Labor Commission Board of 
Appeals on September 1, 1998. The Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission 
entered its order denying the motion for review in which it adopted the report of Dr. 
David McCann and affirmed the order of the ALJ and concluded that Appellant did not 
suffer a mental injury or post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the December 15, 
1993, incident and even if she did suffer an injury, it did not result in impairment or 
disability from work. This conclusion is supported by Dr. McCann's extensive report, 
Dr. Gary DeVries affidavit, in part by Dr. Burgoyne's conclusions and Appellant's long 
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work history after the incident at work on December 15, 1993. (R. 353-354). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Order of the Commission in favor of the Appellees should be affirmed. 
Appellant's arguments are difficult to follow, but the central issue is whether the order 
and findings of the Commission are supported by substantial evidence, not whether, as 
the Appellant argues, there is evidence to support a contrary finding. Based on the 
substantial evidence standard, the examination and evaluation of Dr. David McCann, the 
affidavit of the treating psychologist, Dr. Gary DeVries, and even, in part, Dr. Robert 
Burgoyne's report, provide substantial evidence to support the conclusions of the 
Commission that (1) the Appellant did not suffer an injury as a result of the December 
15, 1993, incident, and (2) even if she did, it did not result in any impairment or 
disability from work. 
In addition, it was well within the discretion of the Commission to reject the 
findings of the medical panel when its conclusions are supported by substantial evidence 
as in this case. 
Finally, the Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence supporting the 
Commission's findings, as required by well established Utah law. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE 
COMMISSION THAT THE DECEMBER 15,1993, INCIDENT DID 
NOT CAUSE APPELLANT TO SUFFER FROM POST-TRAUMATIC 
STRESS DISORDER OR OTHER MENTAL INJURY 
Standard of Review 
Both the ALJ and the Commission concluded that the substantial evidence 
supported the conclusion that the Appellant did noLsuffer from post traumatic stress 
disorder or mental injury rendering Appellant incapable of working and qualifying her 
for temporary total or temporary partial disability. (R. 297-309, 352-354; see also 
Addendum). 
Appellant correctly notes that the ALJ ( or the Commissioner) is not bound by the 
report of the medical panel "if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports 
a contrary finding." U.C.A. § 35-1 -77(2)(d)( 1996). See virtually identical provision in 
U.C.A. §34A-2-601(2)(e) (1997). However, Appellant argues confusingly that there is 
no evidence to support the ALJ or Commission's conclusions. In so claiming, she fails 
to marshal all the evidence supporting the conclusion that the Appellant did not suffer an 
injury. 
It has long been required that: 
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[A J party challenging the findings must "marshaH" (sic) all of 
the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite 
supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or 
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence, (emphasis added) 
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App. 1989), and 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., v. Board of Review of Ins. Com 'n., 839 P. 2d, 841 
(Utah App. 1991). 
This Court has upheld the rejection by the Commission of medical panel findings 
when a contrary conclusion was supported by substantial evidence. See e.g. USX Corp. 
v. Industrial Commin, 781 P.2d 883 (Utah App. 1989). Furthermore, in the face of 
conflicting medical evidence, it is the responsibility of the ALJ to resolve factual 
conflicts. Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d 237 (Utah 1987). See also Large v. 
Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988) where this Court upheld the 
denial of benefits because there was substantial evidence in the record to support the lack 
of medical causation. 
Substantial Evidence Supporting Commission 
The Appellant in her brief seems to catalogue some of the evidence, but does not 
amass all of the evidence adverse to her case. Indeed, evidence supporting the 
Commission is substantial and supports its conclusions that the December 15, 1993, 
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work incident did not cause the Appellant to suffer post traumatic stress disorder or some 
other mental injury which prevented or limited her from working. 
The treating psychologist, Dr. Gary DeVries, supports this conclusion when he 
stated in his May 15, 1996, Affidavit: 
5. Prior to December 15, 1993, she and her husband, Robert 
Vanderwood, visited me in conjunction with marital difficulties. 
I counseled them both together and separately. 
6. On or about December 16, 1993, Mrs. Vanderwood sought 
counseling with me, in part, because of an incident occurring at 
work the day before involving patient treatment, but also due to 
an incident with her husband which involved issues with him 
dating prior to December 15, 1993, as well as an incident where 
she fired a pistol at him on December 16, 1993. 
7. I also counseled with Mrs. Vanderwood on December 20, 
1993, December 22, 1993, January 13, 1994, January 25, 1994, and 
April 13 or April 14, 1994. She canceled her appointment for June 
22, 1994. 
8. Among these visits, only the December 16, 1993, session dealt 
directly with the incident at work on December 15, 1993. The 
subsequent sessions dealt with her marital problems and 
conflicts with her husband. 
9. As far as I am able to ascertain follow. ig the December 15, 
1993, incident she was able to return to w jrk. Furthermore, she was 
able to perform her work at required levels of competence. 
10. As far as I was able to determine from her visits with 
me. there was nothing to suggest that as a result of the December 
15. 1993. incident she suffered any permanent impairment of 
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any nature. (R. 149) (emphasis added) 
In addition, Dr. David McCann, in his October 1, 1996, report of his examination 
and evaluation of Appellant reviewed the records of Dr. DeVries. He noted that these 
records comment on issues with the Appellant's husband, and specifically notes: "There 
was no specific mention of post traumatic residual symptoms." (R. 248). 
Dr. McCann went into great detail describing his analysis of her condition. His 
report comprises some 27 pages. (R. 229-255). Dr. McCann concluded that the 
Appellant did not have post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) because she did not 
spontaneously describe the classic symptoms. (R. 251). He noted that initially she did 
have some dreams, but "the dreams improved as her psychological condition worsened." 
(R. 251). He also concluded that the patient's symptoms appeared to be primarily 
depressive associated with marital and other forms of interpersonal deterioration and that 
she did not meet classic diagnosis of PTSD because there was not an adverse response to 
returning to the site of the traumatic event as evidenced by her working for some eight 
months at the hospital without interruption. 
After some 25 pages of analysis, Dr. McCann came to the following conclusions: 
In response to the question, "Is Ms. Straub unable to work as a result of the 
incident at work which occurred at McKay Dee Hospital on December 15, 1993?" 
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ANSWER: The patient continued to work full time at the 
same regular job for approximately seven months. She 
continued to work after that time training horses and teaching 
riding on a full time, (sic) She continues to perceive herself as 
able to work, as she applied for work in many different 
capacities. It was only after she failed to find work that she 
decided she was not able to work. There was no 
contemporaneous evidence in the record for the development 
of any psycho pathology sufficiently severe to cause 
disability which would be directly attributed to the incident 
of December 15, 1993. (R. 254.) 
In answer to the question, "Is there any medical demonstrable relationship 
between the incident on December 15, 1993, and the post traumatic stress disorder or 
other admitted disability," Dr. McCann responded: 
ANSWER: The patient's mental disability is attributable to 
much more standard problems with personality disturbance, 
disappointments and interpersonal functioning, subsequent 
negative events (such as jail term and the decision to give up 
her job), and lack of supportive relationships than it is to any 
specific post-traumatic factors. The patient does not 
demonstrate an overall symptom pattern consistent with the 
consequences of post-traumatic stress. There is no clear 
causal connection between the patient's symptoms and the 
incident of December 15, 1993. (R. 254) 
In a November 11, 1996, letter by Dr. McCann submitted to the ALJ on 
November 13, but missing from the record, Dr. McCann stated: 
In summary, Tenne Straub is a woman with clinical 
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depression who has endorsed a broad range of symptoms. 
She has many personal problems. There was a very long 
delay before she identified the incident at the hospital as a 
problem. In answers to interrogatories as well as her 
deposition, Ms. Straub does not relate quitting her job at 
McKay-Dee Hospital to the incident of December 15, 1993. 
The evidence does not support a causal connection between 
the incident and the patient's present emotional disturbance. 
(R. 269) 
See Addendum, Exhibit C, pg. 3. 
Significantly, Dr. Robert H. Burgoyne, a psychiatrist on the medical panel, stated: 
She is not disabled as a result of this (post-traumatic stress 
disorder) as she is working now and did work for a time after 
the event. (R. 289). 
Accordingly, there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by 
both the ALJ and the Commission that the Appellant is not suffering from post traumatic 
stress disorder or some other mental illness as a result of the December 15, 1993, work 
incident and that her problems are due to other severe personal stressors as enumerated 
above. 
POINT II 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF THE 
COMMISSION THAT THE DECEMBER 15,1993 INCIDENT DID NOT 
RESULT IN ANY IMPAIRMENT OR DISABILITY FROM WORK 
The Appellant has made a meager effort to marshal some of the evidence with 
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provide evidence to support the conclusion that the December 15, 1993, incident did not 
result in the impairment of her ability to work. Nevertheless, Appellant has failed to 
marshal all the evidence as required1 and there are additional facts which when combined 
with what Appellant has already noted provided substantial evidence to support the 
conclusion of the Commission regarding Appellant's ability to work. 
Substantial evidence which supports the Commission's conclusion regarding 
ability to work is as follows : 
1. Dr. DeVries, in his May 15, 1996, Affidavit states in paragraph 9: 
As far as I was able to ascertain, following the December 15, 
1993, incident she (Mrs. Vanderwood) was able to work. 
Furthermore, she was able to perform her work at required levels 
of competence. ( R. 149). 
2. The Appellant worked continuously from December 15, 1993, until she 
voluntarily terminated her employment with McKay-Dee Hospital on August 28, 1994, 
with a full salary extension through December 28, 1994. (R. 257, pg. 43-45). 
3. While she was in the Weber County Jail from July 5 to August 4, 1994, she 
trained horses every day on a work release training horses, choosing not to work at the 
hospital during the period. (R. 257, pg. 47). 
1Intermountain Health Care v. Board of Review, supra. 
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4. The reason for termination of employment was not due to the December 
15, 1993, incident. Appellant was concerned about her jail sentence, her divorce, and 
embarrassment from being asked about jail by co-employees. (R. 257, pg 42-45). 
5. After terminating employment with McKay-Dee Hospital the Appellant 
trained horses and gave riding lessons 40 hours per week for which she was paid $10 to 
$15 per hour. She did this from August of 1994 until July of 1995. (R. 257, pg. 46-47). 
6. In July, 1995, Appellant's father suffered a heart attack and she worked on 
his ranch in Arizona for room and board and $600 per month until November, 1995, 
when she returned to Logan, Utah. (R. 257, pg. 46-48). 
7. After voluntarily terminating her employment with McKay-Dee 
Hospital in August, 1994, the Appellant applied for a number of jobs. 
A. In November of 1994, she applied to be a sleep lab technician in 
Cache Valley Oxygen and Home Health Center. (R. 257, pg. 48). 
B. In December, 1994, she applied for a job as a respiratory therapist at 
Logan Regional Hospital. (R. 278, pg. 49). 
C. She applied for a job as a receptionist at Bridgerland-Cache Animal 
Hospital in December of 1994. (R. 257, pg. 49). 
D. She applied for a position as a dental hygienist in Logan, Utah, in 
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March of 1995. (R. 257, pg. 49). 
E. She applied at Kelly Temporary Services in April of 1995. (R. 257, 
pg. 49.) 
F. In January, 1996, she applied for a job as a receptionist at Cache 
Valley Cardiology. (R. 257, pg. 49). 
G. In January of 1996, she applied for a job at the National Environment 
Health Co. in Logan. (R. 257, pg. 50). 
H. In January of 1996, she applied for a job at Computer Station. (R. 
257,pg.50). 
I. In January, 1996, she applied for a job at Cache Valley 
Communications Center. (R. 257, pg. 50). 
J. In January, 1996, she applied for a job with Team Tour Management. 
(R.257,pg.50). 
K. In February of 1996, once her respiratory licensure was cleared, she 
reapplied for a job at Logan Regional Hospital as a respiratory 
therapist. (R. 257, pg. 50). 
L. She also applied for a job at Cache Valley Oxygen in the sleep lab. 
(R.257,pg.51). 
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M. After January of 1996, she testified at the time of the hearing that she 
had a "folder full of jobs" she has applied for. (R. 257, pg. 52). 
N. In August of 1996, she applied for a job with ICON. (R. 257, pg. 52). 
O. In March of 1996, she also applied with LDS Hospital as a 
respiratory therapist. (R. 257, pg. 53). 
P. At the time of the hearing she also indicated that she had worked 
several jobs with Kelly Temporary Services in 1996. (R. 257, pg. 
53). 
Q. She also indicated that she was a student at the Bridger Applied 
Technology 
Center between March and May of 1996. (R.257, pg. 17). 
R. Following the hearing in October 1996, the psychiatric report of Dr. 
Robert Burgoyne indicates that the Appellant spent the five months 
prior to April of 1997 with her mother in New Mexico. It is 
unknown what she did there. (R. 256) 
S. As of the time of the medical panel psychiatric evaluation she was 
working in the deli at Smiths in Logan, Utah, and had worked there 
for five months. (R. 286). 
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T. Her license to practice as a respiratory therapist expired in 
September, 1996. (R. 349.). 
U. She told Dr. David McCann she placed 35 resumes searching for 
work. (R. 234). 
V. She received the proceeds from the sale of her home amounting to 
approximately $67,000 in 1995. (R. 257, pg 68-69). 
Appellant claims temporary total disability and temporary partial disability. 
However, the fact that the Appellant has either worked or sought work continuously since 
her alleged work related incident on December 15, 1993, does not allow her to qualify for 
these benefits. Temporary total disability is provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-65 
(1996) and U.C.A. § 34A-2-410 (1997), and although the meaning of temporary total 
disability benefits has not been defined by the legislature, this Court, in the case of 
Griffith v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 754 P. 2d 981, 983 (Utah App. 1988), stated: 
Temporary total disability benefits are typically awarded after 
a worker suffers a job-related disability that prevents him or 
her from returning to work. {Booms v. Rapp Constr.Co., 720 
P. 2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 1986)) Temporary disability 
compensation is intended to be just that, temporary. It merely 
provides an employee with income during the time he 
recuperates from work-related injuries until his condition has 
reached medical stabilization. 
Temporary total disability benefits are paid only until stabilization occurs. 
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However, in the instant case there was no period of "job-related disability," which 
temporarily prevented the Appellant from working. She worked continuously or sought 
employment from December, 1993 onward, even during the time she was in jail in 1994. 
Even the medical panel noted her work record. (R. 286). 
The Appellant is similarly not entitled to temporary partial disability benefits. See 
U.C.A. § 35-1-65 (1996) and U.C.A. § 34A-2-411. As the administrative law judge 
noted: 
In order for a finding of temporary partial disability to be 
made, an injured worker must not be able to work as many 
hours or be able to perform the exertion required of her before 
the industrial injury. 
(R. 307). 
The ALJ and the Commission correctly concluded that because of her work history 
there was not sufficient evidence to support a claim that she was not able to work as many 
hours as she had before December 15, 1993, and further, the evidence did not support a 
conclusion that she was unable to perform less exertion after December 15, 1993, than 
before. In fact, after the December 15, 1993, incident until she voluntarily terminated her 
employment at McKay-Dee Hospital, she worked "a lot of overtime." (R. 126 pg, 66). 
In summary, there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings 
that the Appellant did not suffer an injury which prevented her from working or 
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performing gainful employment and, therefore, she did not qualify for temporary total or 
temporary partial disability compensation. Based on this substantial evidence, which was 
recounted in detail by the ALJ in his decision and confirmed by the Commission as set 
forth herein, the order of the Commission should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
NEITHER THE COMMISSION NOR THE ALJ IS BOUND 
BY THE FINDINGS OF THE MEDICAL PANEL 
On page 5 of Appellant's brief under the heading "Summary of Argument," she 
states: 
The findings of the medical panel are supported by the facts of 
this case and, because there is no conflicting evidence to 
support contrary findings, the ALJ is bound by the panel's 
report. By rejecting the conclusions of the medical panel, the 
ALJ committed reversible error. 
As a procedural matter, the pertinent statute in this instance is U.C.A. 
§34A-2-601(2)(e)(1997) which states: 
The administrative law judge may base the administrative law 
judge's findings and decision on the report of the panel, 
medical director, or medical consultants but is not bound by 
the report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case 
supports a contrary finding, (emphasis added). 
The ALJ and the Commission both specifically found that there was substantial 
evidence to support their findings and conclusions and detailed these facts. (R. 297-
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309; 352-355; Addendum, Exhibits A & B). The Commission adopted the report of Dr. 
David McCann, Appellees' expert psychiatrist as being most persuasive. Indeed, even the 
report of Dr. Burgoyne, in part, supports the Appellees' position. (R. 298) Accordingly, 
there is substantial evidence as abundantly noted above to support the findings and 
conclusions of both the Commission and the ALJ. Therefore, the order of the 
Commission should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Abundant and substantial evidence has been provided and recounted herein 
supporting the findings and conclusions of both the ALJ and the Commission. 
Accordingly, the order of the Commission should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this JL^fday of January, 1999. 
BURBIDGE, CARNAHAN, OSTLER & WHITE 
ld± 
Larry R. White 
Attorneys for Respondents/Appellees 
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26 
ADDENDUM 
27 
Exhibit A 
Order of Labor Commission 
APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
TENNE STRAUB, f.k.a. * 
TENNE VANDERWOOD, * 
* ORDER DENYING 
Applicant, * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH * Case No. 95-1044 
CARE, INC., * 
Defendant. * 
Tenne Straub asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review the 
Administrative Law Judge's denial of her claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation 
Act ("the Act" hereafter; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Ms. Straub contends the ALJ's findings of fact are inconsistent with the evidence presented 
in this matter. She also contends the ALJ erred in concluding that she failed to establish that her 
alleged work injury resulted in any period of disability that is compensable under the Act. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Ms. Straub claims disability compensation for alleged post traumatic stress syndrome 
("PTSD") arising from an incident that occurred while she was employed as a respiratory therapist 
at Intermountain Health Care ("IHC") on December 15,1993. On that date, Ms. Straub was assisting 
in the care of an elderly patient who had recently undergone lung surgery. The patient's breathing 
support system was incorrectly connected, causing too much pressure in the patient's chest. The 
patient suffered cariac arrest as a result of the error and died several weeks later. Despite the 
foregoing incident, Ms. Straub completed her regular shift that day. Except for an absence of 1 
month, which will be discussed below, she continued to work at IHC on a full time basis until 
August 1994. 
Ms. Straub has suffered from chronic depression during most of her adult life. This 
depression worsened some time prior to her work accident on December 15, 1993. She also 
experienced substantial marital difficulties prior to the date of the work accident. Concurrent with 
00352 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
TENNE STRAUB-VANDERWOOD 
PAGE 2 
the accident, Ms Straub's husband informed her that he wanted a divorce This set off a chain of 
events that resulted in Ms Straub assaulting her husband on two different occasions, pleading guilty 
to criminal charges arising from the assaults, and being sentenced to one month in jail during July 
1994 During the period of her incarceration, Ms Straub participated in a work release program that 
allowed her to leave the jail during the day Although she could have worked at IHC during this 
time, she chose to train horses and give riding lessons instead 
Ms Straub returned to work at IHC after completing her jail sentence, but found the work 
environment uncomfortable due to co-workers' questions about her time in jail During August 
1994, she accepted a voluntary lay off from IHC and received a se\erance package that paid her 90% 
of her regular wage for a period of 90 days 
In November 1994, Ms Straub moved to Logan, Utah In earl> 1995 she resumed giving 
riding lessons and training horses on a daily basis This lasted until August 1995, when she moved 
to Arizona to work for her father on his ranch She returned to Logan in March 1996 and began 
seeking employment as a respiratory technician and in other health care positions, without success 
She is now employed at a grocery store delicatessen 
The medical experts who have provided evidence in this matter disagree over the origins, 
causes and extent of Ms Straub's current problems The Appeals Board has carefully evaluated the 
various medical expert opinions, both in terms of their thoroughness and analysis and their 
consistency with objective external evidence The Appeals Board finds the report of Dr McCann 
to be persuasive regarding the medical issues involved herein The Appeals Board therefore adopts 
the findings set forth in Dr McCann's report and concludes that Ms Straub does not suffer from 
PTSD as a result of the work related incident at IHC on December 15, 1993 The Appeals Board 
further concludes that Ms Straub has not been impaired from working since that date as a result of 
the incident 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 34A-2-401 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act pro\ides disability 
compensation to employees injured by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's 
work The crux of Ms Straub's claim for temporary total, temporary partial, and permanent partial 
disability compensation is that e\ents of her work at IHC on December 15,1993 caused her to suffer 
from PTSD or some other mental or emotional injury which has either prevented her from working 
or limited her ability to work ] 
1
 The Appeals Board notes that the Act was substantively amended in 1995 to establish 
specific criteria for the compensability of injuries arising from work related mental stress 
However, because Ms Straub's claim arises from an incident that occurred prior to the effective 
date of the 1995 amendments, the Appeals Board does not apply such amendments to Ms 
Straub's claim 
00353 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
TENNE STRAUB-VANDERWOOD 
PAGE 3 
As previously noted, the Appeals Board has carefully reviewed the medical evidence and 
opinion in this matter and finds Dr. McCann's report and opinion persuasive. Dr. McCann's report 
is based on a thorough examination and psychological testing of Ms. Straub. The report is balanced 
and well reasoned. Furthermore, it is consistent with other objective facts of record. While the 
Appeals Board is sympathetic to Ms. Straub's circumstances, the Appeals Board concludes that Ms. 
Straub did not suffer an injury as a result of the incident of December 15, 1993 at IHC. 
The Appeals Board further concludes that even if Ms. Straub did suffer an injury, the injury 
has not resulted in any impairment or disability from work. This conclusion is also supported by Dr. 
McCann's report and opinion, as well as by Ms. Straub's extensive work history after the accident. 
ORDER 
For the reasons set forth in this decision, the Appeals Board affirms the order of the ALJ and 
denies Ms. Straub's motion for review.2 It is so ordered. 
Dated this 1^- day of Aug«st, 1998. 
Colleen S. Colton, Chair 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the 
court within 30 days of the date of this order. 
2
 The Appeals Board notes that IHC has not moved for review of that portion of the 
ALJ's decision which ordered payment for three months of treatment for Ms. Straub's mental 
stress. Since IHC did not appeal that determination, it remains in effect. 
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Exhibit B 
Order of Administrative Law Judge 
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH 
PO BOX 146615 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6615 
Case No. 951044 
TENNE STRAUB-VANDERWOOD, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
MCKAY DEE HOSPITAL and 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, 
INC. (Self-Insured), 
Defendants. 
• 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
• • • • * • • • • • • • * • • • 
BEFORE: The Honorable Benjamin A. Sims, Presiding Law 
Judge. 
APPEARANCES: Larry R. White, Attorney at Law represented the 
defendants. 
Thomas R. Blonquist, Attorney at Law represented 
the applicant. 
This is a claim for medical expenses, temporary total 
disability compensation (TTC) from July 1, 1994 to the present, 
temporary partial disability compensation (TPC), permanent partial 
impairment compensation (PPC), and travel expenses based upon 
"emotional distress" resulting from the death of a patient for whom 
the petitioner Tenne Jane Straub aka Tenne Vanderwood was caring on 
December 15, 1993 while employed by McKay-Dee Hospital, a unit of 
Intermountain Health Care (IHC). 
The respondent McKay-Dee asserts various defenses, and denies 
that it is liable for her medical and mental problems. Further, 
the respondent alleges that petitioner has been capable of working 
after the incident, and that she has continued working. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. At the time of injury on December 15, 1993, the petitioner 
was 39 years old, and was working as a respiratory therapist at the 
respondent McKay-Dee Hospital (McKay-Dee). The current allegations 
of mental stress injury arose out of a situation in which a 74 year 
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old female patient of the petitioner had recently undergone a 
partial pneumonectomy because of tuberculous damage to her lungs. 
Respiratory support for the post-operative patient included nasal 
intubation with free flow oxygen and air from the hospital wall 
source. The patient was changed from hospital wall source oxygen 
to a portable oxygen tank. During the attempt to ambulate the 
patient, the patient started to gag and developed respiratory 
distress. 
Petitioner and the attending nurse responded to the patient's 
distress and returned her to the hospital bed. The petitioner 
reconnected the patient to the hospital oxygen source. The 
secretions and gagging were addressed with a suction catheter. 
During the process of reconnecting the patient, the safety "Y" was 
omitted allowing for no exit of the excess pressurized oxygen from 
the closed system of respiratory support. 
A crisis developed when the pressurized oxygen and air mixture 
broke into the patient's subcutaneous space and she began to 
inflate like a balloon. As soon as the problem was recognized, the 
patient was disconnected from the pressurized oxygen source. The 
patient developed pulmonary cardiac arrest. A code was called; 
emergency support was given, and the patient was transferred to the 
intensive care unit. The patient lived for six more weeks before 
she died. Although suit was filed against McKay-Dee, the 
petitioner was never named as a party. 
Petitioner says that she reacted to the incident by going into 
a form of shock. She says that she went into a daze and could not 
think straight. After the incident at work, she claims she had 
difficulties for about seven months. The records also show that 
she had been having domestic problems with her husband and his 
children prior to the industrial event. These problems were 
concerned with integrating the children from two families into one. 
Petitioner and her husband began seeing Dr. DeVries for marital and 
family counseling prior to the December 15th incident. 
On the day of the incident, her husband picked her up from 
work. She told him what had happened. He told her that the only 
way for them to survive the consequences of her mistake was to get 
a divorce. She was surprised because she did not think that her 
marriage problems were that bad. She had been married to him for 
about four years. There had been conflicts between them, but she 
believed most of the difficulty was related to the children. 
The petitioner was distressed with her husband because of his 
lack of support for her. The following day after the industrial 
2 
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accident, her husband went to ride his horse, and she followed him. 
He refused to talk about the problems. When they returned to the 
house, her frustration became anger, and she began to throw his 
belongings onto the back patio. Her husband approached her in an 
angry manner. He was six feet, five inches tall, and his anger 
made her very afraid because she says that he had physically abused 
her previously. 
When she heard her husband coming, she picked up a loaded .357 
Magnum pistol which was kept nearby. She recalls the gun firing; 
her husband turned around and walked away. She put the gun down, 
and locked the doors. Her husband went to a nearby telephone and 
called the police. When the police arrived, she was taken to Dr. 
DeVries' office, but she did not see Dr. DeVries. She saw another 
professional whose name she does not recall. 
In February 1994, her husband claimed that she hit him with a 
branding iron, and punched him in the face. Her husband complained 
to the police; she was arrested, booked, and released on bail. Her 
husband pressed charges for the assault and battery. Eventually 
the matter went to court, and she was sentenced to 30 days in jail. 
She served the 30 days in the Ogden City Jail in July 1994. This 
event made her very ashamed. She recalled the jail experience as 
very unpleasant because she had to undergo body cavity searches 
each time she would return from work to the jail. 
The couple was unable to work out their differences, and a 
divorce was finalized in October 1994. 
While incarcerated, she was allowed to be on work release to 
train horses. She also trained horses and gave riding lessons from 
January through August 1995 on a daily basis. 
In the summer of 1995, her Father had a heart attack so she 
went to Arizona to work on his ranch between August and November. 
She was paid $600 per month for performing duties on the ranch. 
She injured her back in Arizona and was troubled with back pain for 
a period of two and one-half months. 
The evidence shows that she worked continuously from December 
15, 1993 to the time of her return to Logan in 1996. She returned 
to look for work as a respiratory therapist. She continued to 
search for any kind of work through April 1996. She also enrolled 
in a technical institute to study to become a draftsman. She had 
difficulties in coping with life during the period. Relatives on 
both sides of the family made critical remarks about her. 
3 
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There was a conflict between the mental health professionals 
in this case as to whether her mental stress problems were related 
to the incident of December 15, 1993, or were related to 
preexisting and/or postexisting problems associated with her 
diagnosed personality disorder and/or stress from other non work 
related situations. Dr. Card indicated that she suffered from 
posttraumatic stress disorder as a result of the December 15, 1993 
incident, and Dr. McCann disagreed. Dr. McCann feels it is clear 
she is over endorsing all items on psychological tests which tend 
to indicate that she has any problem whatsoever. He suggested she 
may be currently malingering. 
The evidence shows that she left her employment at McKay-Dee 
primarily because of her jail sentence and her divorce. She was 
embarrassed about the questions being asked by her fellow employees 
in connection with the criminal and divorce proceedings. She 
voluntarily terminated her employment. 
The case was sent to a medical panel (panel) on July 21, 1997. 
The medical panel consisted of a psychiatrist as member, and a 
neurologist as chair. The panel met on September 18, 1997 to 
review the file, the records, and to examine the petitioner. The 
panel report (report) was filed on October 24, 1997, and it was 
sent to the parties for objections and comments on the same date. 
The respondent timely filed its objections on November 7, 1997. No 
objections were filed by the petitioner. 
The panel concluded the following in terms of reasonable 
medical probability: 
1. The petitioner suffers from posttraumatic stress 
disorder as a result of the December 15, 1993 industrial incident. 
2. The period of time the petitioner suffered from 
posttraumatic stress disorder or any other disability is 
approximately from the date of the injury, and continues to the 
present time. 
3. Although she has had symptoms since the event of 
December 15, 1993, she has managed to be gainfully employed over 
extended periods of time. 
4. She is not suffering at present from permanent 
partial impairment as a result of the December 15, 1993 incident. 
She has a temporary partial impairment. 
5. The trauma of December 1993 did affect her ability to 
4 
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work during periods between December 15, 1993 and March 1996. 
6. Specific future treatment reasonably required as a 
result of the December 15, 1993 incident would include 
approximately three months of psychotherapy to deal with the post 
traumatic stress disorder, and associated depression, including 
appropriate medications and counseling regarding occupational goals 
and activities. 
The respondent objected to the medical panel report on the 
following grounds: 
1. At page 2, paragraph 4, the "panel made a factual 
determination which is inconsistent with prior statements of the 
petitioner and contrary to the ALJ instructions regarding the 
reasons she quit her employment." 
It is noted that the reference is probably not 
accurate. There seems to be nothing in paragraph four which 
relates to the reasons the petitioner quit her employment with the 
respondents. Paragraph three, however, indicates the following: 
"The petitioner felt she was badly affected 
by her role in the incident. She was trans-
ferred out of any intensive care activity and 
did floor staffing. She continued to work, 
but finally felt so troubled by the attitudes 
of the people around her, which often seemed 
to include ridicule, so that she finally quit." 
The statement that the petitioner was troubled by the attitudes of 
her fellow workers is not inconsistent with the instructions given 
by the ALJ to the panel. The panel notes that they read the letter 
of instructions, and presumably followed its requirements. There 
is no indication in the above statement that they were drawing any 
contrary conclusions. 
2. The respondent notes that the report at page 4 
indicates that the petitioner is suffering from temporary partial 
disability, and is inconsistent with the report of Dr. Burgoyne 
(the psychiatrist member of the panel). The respondent further 
notes that Dr. Burgoyne reported that "[S]he is not disabled from 
work inasmuch as she is working 4 0 hours a week and has done so 
continuously since the time that she voluntarily resigned her 
employment from McKay-Dee Hospital."Page 2, paragraph 2 of 
respondents' objections. Dr. Burgoyne noted the following: 
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"...[S]he is not disabled as a result of the 
December 15, 1993 industrial accident. How-
ever, she is not disabled as a result of this 
as she is working now and did work for a time 
after the event. This is not a permanent pro-
blem... There needs to be closure of this case 
and then about three months of psychotherapy 
should get the patient back to where she could 
function without the stress." 
Report of Dr. Burgoyne at page 4. The judge is unable to find in 
Dr. Burgoynefs report where he concluded as stated by the 
respondents that she has continuously worked for 40 hours per week 
after voluntarily resigning her employment with McKay-Dee Hospital. 
However, it is clear that Dr. Burgoyne indicates that she is not 
disabled because she is able to work, and did so after the event. 
He indicates that she does need some psychotherapy. 
The express and implied meaning of Dr. Burgoyne's 
report is that the petitioner currently suffers from stress, and 
needs psychotherapy to overcome her problems. This is not 
inconsistent with the apparent view of the panel that she has not 
been functioning to her highest level because of her work related 
stress. 
3. The respondent further argues that because the 
petitioner is working full time there is no evidence of temporary 
partial disability. They note that she has applied for respiratory 
therapy jobs on more than one occasion and is not working in the 
field only because a position was not offered, not because of 
mental trauma. Moreover, they state, there is no evidence that she 
is not capable of working as a respiratory therapist. They point 
to the affidavit of Dr. DeVries and the report of Dr. McCann as 
support for this position. This argument has merit. 
4. The respondent also argues that the medical panel 
failed to review all the medical records including the independent 
medical evaluation of Dr. McCann and the psychological testing and 
the records of Dr. DeVries. The argument is apparently based on 
the statement of the panel that it reviewed some of the 
petitioner's medical records. The reference to "some" is contained 
on page 3 of the report where the panel discusses her medical 
problems which were previous to her instant industrial event. The 
panel can scan some documents and review others. The argument of 
the respondent is speculation about what the panel did and did not 
review and is rejected on this basis. There is no requirement that 
the panel review every document with the same degree of scrutiny. 
6 
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Obviously, the documents which are material and relevant to the 
issue of mental stress would get the most attention. 
It is clear that the medical records were reviewed 
by the panel to determine her previously existing physical state. 
The panel noted that it reviewed the letter of instructions to them 
from the judge "in detail." This letter referred to both the 
reports of Dr. Card and Dr. McCann. Presumably, the panel reviewed 
the available documents. There is no obligation that the panel 
list every document which it reviews. 
5. The respondent states that pursuant to U.C.A. §35-1-
45.1(2) there is insufficient information and no findings 
determining that the alleged mental distress suffered by the 
petitioner was predominantly and directly the result of her 
employment. This objection is rejected since the cited statute did 
not become effective until May 1, 1995 which was subsequent to the 
industrial event at issue in this case. 
6. The respondent urges that Dr. Burgoyne made material 
mistakes in his history taken from the petitioner when he noted 
that the petitioner received no counseling immediately after or 
subsequent to the "alleged" traumatic event. In addition, the 
respondent states that Dr. Burgoyne believed that the petitioner 
was jailed as a result of slapping her husband, and that she 
minimized the amount of stress which she experienced as a result of 
being jailed. Further, the respondents argue that Dr. Burgoyne 
falsely believed that she "chose" to go to jail, that the panel 
ignored or disregarded large portions of the medical record, and 
that the panel uncritically accepted the statements of the 
petitioner without relying upon the facts found by the judge. 
This, urges the respondents, renders the panel report flawed and 
objectionable, and lacking in credibility without proper 
foundation. 
The statement that the panel accepted the 
petitioner's version of events uncritically and did not rely upon 
the facts as found by the judge is over broad, and is not correct. 
Trie panel reviewed the letter to them from the judge in detail. 
The panel used the letter which outlined all the facts stated in 
the instant Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. Dr. 
Burgoynefs statement that the petitioner received no counseling 
immediately or subsequent to the industrial incident is essentially 
correct. Dr. DeVries reports in his affidavit that the petitioner 
counseled with him on six occasions, and on only one of these 
visits (December 16, 1993) did the session deal in part with the 
work incident. Dr. DeVries further reported that as far as he was 
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able to ascertain, she was capable of returning to work, and was 
able to perform her work to required levels of competence. The 
remaining arguments of respondent are make weight statements which 
are not consistent with reality. It is clear, however, that her 
experience at the jail had a great effect on her, and that the 
panel recognized such. For example, Dr. Burgoyne noted that there 
were other stressful events in the petitioner's life besides the 
work incident. 
8. The respondent concludes by objecting to the panel 
report arguing that the panel " [acted] solely on what the 
petitioner told it, accepted her statements uncritically without 
reference to the established facts, prior inconsistent statements 
and the available medical records." The respondent's statement is 
made in the absolute. To read it, one would conclude that the 
panel did nothing correct, and totally rejected the judge's letter 
to it. The judge has reviewed the respondents' objections, allied 
documents, and the panel report several times. It is concluded 
that the respondent made a number of assumptions and speculations 
about what the panel read and concluded, and that the respondent's 
beliefs are largely incorrect. 
The respondent requests that a hearing be ordered, that the 
medical panel be examined by the respondents, and that Dr. McCann 
be allowed to present his conclusions. There is no need for 
another hearing since the report is not as suspect as the 
respondent has alleged. However, there are some aspects of it that 
need to be corrected, and will be modified by this Order. 
It is clear from the medical evidence and the evidence taken 
at the hearing that the petitioner had a great deal of stress in 
her life previous to the industrial event on December 15, 1993. 
She had, among other problems, suffered depression from 1991 
through 1993 for which she took the antidepressant Prozac. She 
quit taking the medication on December 16, 1993, the day after the 
industrial event. MR 44. At the time of the industrial event, she 
was having marital problems with her third husband, and the 
children of their previous marriages. She was undergoing 
counseling for about six months with Dr. DeVries even before the 
December 15, 1994 event. Subsequent to the industrial event, her 
problems escalated when her husband asked her for a divorce, and 
she was later jailed for 30 days as a result of her discharging a 
pistol at him, and assault and battery upon him. There is no doubt 
that the death of her patient as a result of a series of 
unfortunate events was a significant event among a series of other 
significant personal and nonwork related incidents which no doubt 
caused her great stress in her life. The evidence shows that she 
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continued to work, even while in jail, and that the stresses in her 
life including the industrial event may have slowed her down, but 
did not stop her from working full time. Thus, it is clear that 
the stress which resulted from the death of her patient was a 
temporary phenomenon rather than a long term debilitating stressor. 
Her wages in 1993 from IHC were $33,000, and her wages in 1994 
were $26,000. She worked at McKay-Dee from the date of the 
industrial event to June 1994. She admits to working a lot of 
overtime after the industrial event. 1994 was the year in which 
she served a month in jail, and was undergoing traumatic domestic 
relations problems. The month in jail would have resulted in some 
loss of income, and since she was earning $2,750 per month, it is 
appropriate for comparison purposes to deduct $2,750 from the 
amount of $33,000 which results in $30,250. She not only served 
the 30 days in jail, but was rearrested for allegedly hitting her 
husband in January 1994. In 1994, she voluntarily left employment 
with McKay-Dee on August 28, 1994 as a result of embarrassment 
caused by her incarceration, domestic relation problems, and the 
humiliation of her co-workers knowing about her divorce and jail 
term. She received a separation package which gave her pay through 
120 days after termination or December 28, 1994. 
1994 was also the year in which her divorce was final. The 
divorce was contentious, and the petitioner noted that she had to 
attend court sessions on nine or ten occasions. She went to Logan 
in November 1994. She trained horses and gave riding lessons 
through July 1995. She worked 40 hours per week and earned $10-15 
per hour. 1995 was the year in which she went home to assist her 
Father who had a heart attack. She went to assist her Father from 
July 1995 through November 1, 1995. He paid her $600 per month, 
and she performed these duties full time. She returned to Logan in 
November 1995 at the conclusion of his recuperation and has been 
seeking jobs since. There has been no showing that she cannot work 
40 hours per week. She has continuously worked since the 
industrial event, and since November 1995 she has been seeking 
better employment for herself. 
The medical panel's conclusion that she has been temporarily 
partially disabled from the date of the industrial event to March 
1996 is rejected as not being consistent with the law and evidence. 
The evidence shows that she was working at McKay-Dee after the 
industrial event as a floor staffer. There is no evidence that she 
was paid any less than she was paid as a respiratory therapist or 
that she worked any fewer hours. To the contrary, she says that 
she worked more overtime than she had previous to the industrial 
event. It appears that whatever mental problems she had subsequent 
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to the December 15, 1993 event, they did not prevent her from 
working full time. Her reason for leaving her employment was 
voluntary and not solely related to the industrial event, although 
the industrial event no doubt had some connection along with the 
other tremendous problems she was facing in her personal life. 
Considering the totality of the evidence, there is 
insufficient evidence to show to a preponderance that she was 
either temporarily and totally disabled, or was temporarily 
partially disabled during the period subsequent to December 15, 
1993. It is clear that Dr. Burgoyne does not believe that she is 
permanently and partially impaired as a result of the industrial 
event, and the panel concluded that she had no more temporary 
problems affecting her ability to work by March 1996. She reported 
to Dr. McCann on September 11, 1996 that she had no more than one 
nightmare per month in connection with the industrial event. 
There is some evidence to show that she may have suffered some 
mental problems as a result of the industrial incident. However, 
the evidence shows that her need for medical/psychological 
treatment was temporary, at best. Obviously, the employer should 
not be responsible for treatment for any trauma she suffered as a 
result of jail, her family problems and her divorce, her daughter's 
learning disability, sexual difficulties, business and career 
adjustments, the treatment of her by her parents and relatives, 
her Father's heart attack, her personality problems preexisting the 
industrial event, or other problems unrelated to the December 15, 
1993 event. 
She admits that she never told anyone at the hospital that she 
might have a claim for workers' compensation nor did she ever file 
any kind of form alleging a work related injury. She acknowledges 
that she did not think about filing a claim until she could not 
find a job in 1995. She filed an application for hearing on 
December 11, 1995. Thus, the implication is clear that she was 
aware that she perceived she had a problem with stress shortly 
after the industrial event, or in any event by January 1, 1994, and 
she failed to report her injury to her employer until December 11, 
1995. 
She says that she asked her supervisor shortly after the 
death of the patient that she would like to talk to someone about 
the event. This is not sufficient to inform the respondent that an 
injury has occurred especially since the petitioner continued to 
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work full time until she voluntarily left employment with the 
respondent. In addition, Dr. DeVries, who was counseling her 
before and after the industrial event, reports that he only talked 
to her about the industrial injury on one occasion (December 16, 
1993), and that the remainder of the sessions dealt with marital 
problems- Thus, the other events in her life were felt by her to 
be more significant than that of the industrial event. It is clear 
that she obviously was aware of the problem on December 16, 1993, 
and yet, no claim was made for medical expenses and compensation 
until she claims that she encountered employment problems in 
December 1995. 
Nevertheless, she claims that she asked on a number of 
occasions for counseling. She will be given the benefit of a doubt 
and it will be found that she provided at least notice of a 
marginal nature. She is entitled to not more than three months of 
medical/psychological counseling (consistent with Dr. Burgoyne's 
report) related to the post traumatic stress disorder connected 
with the death of her patient on December 15, 1993. She is not 
entitled to counseling in connection with the trauma related to 
other non work events in her personal life. 
She is not entitled to compensation because the evidence shows 
that she was able to work, and did work during the period 
subsequent to the industrial event. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. Respondent alleges that U.C.A. §35-1-45.1(2) requires that 
findings be made determining that the alleged mental distress 
suffered by the petitioner was predominantly and directly the 
result of her employment. This statute was effective May 1, 1995 
which was subsequent to the date of the industrial event on 
December 15, 1993. Thus, it does not apply to this case. 
2. There has been no showing that the petitioner's disability 
from the emotional stress of the industrial event was total as 
required by law. U.C.A. §35-1-65(1). She is therefore not 
entitled to temporary total disability compensation (TTC). 
3. In order for a finding of temporary partial disability to 
be made, an injured worker must not be able to work as many hours 
or be able to perform the exertion required of her before the 
industrial injury. Accord U.C.A. §35-1-65.1 (stating that an 
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injury must cause temporary partial disability). 
4. The petitioner's temporary mental stress was a normal 
reaction to events surrounding the death of her patient on December 
15, 1993. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the claim for compensation filed by 
Tenne Straub aka Tenne Vanderwood against McKay-Dee Hospital as a 
result of stress on December 15, 1993 is dismissed with prejudice 
since she continued to work essentially full time until the summer 
of 1994, and left her employment voluntarily due primarily to other 
factors not related to the events surrounding the industrial event 
of December 15, 1993. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the claim for medical treatment by 
Tenne Straub aka Tenne Vanderwood shall be paid by the McKay-Dee 
Hospital for temporary treatment of mental stress resulting from 
the industrial event of December 15, 1993; the treatment shall not 
exceed that which can be rendered within three consecutive months, 
and shall be related solely to stress resulting from the industrial 
event; the medical treatment expenses shall be paid consistent with 
the RVS of the Labor Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be received in the offices of the Division of 
Adjudication within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying 
in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless 
received by the Division of Adjudication within thirty (30) days of 
the date hereof, this Order shall be final and not subject to 
review or appeal. If a Motion for Review is received by the 
Division of Adjudication within thirty (30) days of the date 
hereof, any response by the opposing party shall be filed within 15 
days of the date of receipt of the Motion for Review by the 
Division of Adjudication in accordance with U.C.A. Section 63-46b-
12. A Motion for Review will be decided by the Commissioner of the 
Labor Commission unless any of the parties requests that the Motion 
for Review be decided by the Appeals Board in accordance with 
U.C.A. Section 34A-1-303 within thirty (30) days of the date 
hereof, or in the case of a party responding to the Motion for 
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Review, the request must be made within twenty (20) days of the 
date the Motion for Review was filed with the Division of 
Adjudication. 
Dated this day of March 1998. 
A3: straub.wpd 
5mamm"aL Sims 
Iminisjpetive Law Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
i< H^^J^ I hereby certify that on the c^j> day of 
1998, the attached ORDER in the case of Tenne Straub aka Tenne 
Vanderwood v. McKay Dee Hospital and Intermountain Health Care was 
mailed, postage prepaid except as noted below to the following 
persons at the following addresses: 
Larry R. White 
Attorney for Respondent 
50 South Main Street #1400, Box 169 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Thomas R. Blonquist 
Attorney for Applicant 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City UT 84102 
Tenne Straub 
c/o Thomas R. Blonquist 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City UT 84102 
ouskeeper 
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Exhibit C 
Supplemental Report of Dr., McCann 
David L. McCann, M.D., FAPA 
A Professional Corporation 
Diplomate American Board of Psychiatry 
and Neurology, Inc. 
INDEPENDENT PSYCHIATRIC CONSULTATIONS 
November 11, 1996 
Larry R. White, Attorney at Law 
Kirton and McConkie 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Re: Reference Case: Tenne Straub 
Response to the psychological evaluation dated October 23, 1996, 
by Robert D. Card, Ph.D. and Peter M. Byrne, M.S. 
Dear Mr. White: 
At your request, I have reviewed the report of Robert D. Card, Ph.D. dated 
October 23, 1996. There is a significant difference in the methods which Dr. Card used 
to arrive at his opinions compared to the method used to arrive at the opinions 
expressed in my independent medical evaluation dated October 1, 1996. 
When I perform an independent medical evaluation I give patients an open 
opportunity to tell me their perspective on the issues which they believe are relevant. 
Patients then have an opportunity to explain their symptoms and their perception of 
events in a spontaneous and original manner. I review no information which might bias 
me until I have given patients the opportunity to fully explain their point of view. This 
enables me to explore the broadest range of possible interpretations. Patients complete 
a thorough, multidimensional questionnaire before the interview begins. The question-
naire is then later reviewed with patients after they have spontaneously described their 
experiences and impressions. I then am able to review specific symptoms and points of 
history which may not have been covered when the individual patient was taking more of 
the initiative. After I have interviewed the patient, I then review available records that 
pertain to the issues. 
In this case, a binder of records was provided for my review. The record binder 
included legal documents such as responses to interrogatories, the patient's deposition of 
April 19, 1996, court records, affidavits of Dr. DeVries and Dr. Card, as well as clinical 
records. The clinical records that were reviewed included the records of Robert D. Card, 
Ph.D., David Carlquist. M.D., Gary DeVries, Ph.D., McKay Dee Hospital employment 
records, records of Kent Rasmussen, M.D. and records of Thomas Rosenberg, M.D. Dr. 
Card did not indicate that he had reviewed these basic records. 
# 
^ 
4190 Highland Drive Suite 102 Holladay, Utah 84124 
Phone: 801 272-9205 Fax: 801 272-9208 
Kirton & McConkie 
Re: Tenne Straub 
(2) 
During the course of my clinical interview with Tenne Straub on September 11, 
1996, she described a deteriorating pattern of psychological and social functioning. She 
did not describe a pattern of post traumatic stress disorder. She and her husband had 
been in counseling for marital problems of considerable severity prior to the date of the 
McKay-Dee Hospital incident which occurred on December 15, 1993. The marriage was 
on sufficiently shaky grounds that when the unfortunate McKay-Dee Hospital incident oc-
curred, her husband announced a decision to pursue divorce on the same day of the 
incident. Over the following months, the records and affidavits of Dr. Gary DeVries 
indicated that there was no reported distress over the hospital incident and that the 
patient's distress was focused on her deteriorating marriage. As the marital situation 
continued to deteriorate, the patient then behaved in such a way that she was charged 
with domestic violence and eventually spent time in jail. 
The patient said that she had promptly returned to the workplace after the 
incident of December 15, 1993. She said her discomfort at returning to the hospital was 
because she saw her estranged husband, not because she was returning to a place that 
reminded her of emotional trauma related to the incident of December 15th. She 
continued to work on a daily basis until July of 1994, when she served 30 days in the 
Ogden City Jail. She was given release time to work while she was in jail. While she was 
in jail, she worked training horses because she did not feel comfortable doing profes-
sional work when she was serving time in jail. After the jail time, she continued to work 
at McKay-Dee Hospital. After her employment at McKay-Dee Hospital, she continued 
to work training horses . 
She described her depression developing in association with personal problems 
such as her divorce, imprisonment, problems with her father and difficulty in finding 
work. 
After the interview, the patient's response to psychological tests revealed a 
marked pattern of over reporting of symptoms. The MMPI was invalid and demon-
strated symptom exaggeration by a number of standard measures that have been 
developed by psychologists. In the interview she described only occasional stress 
drinking, but on face value items in the Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory, a 
standard test to detect substance abuse, she scored in a range similar to persons with 
severe alcohol and drug problems. This pattern of over endorsement of items suggests 
that any type of psychiatric disorder would likely be confirmed by the patient's subjective 
report. For example, her score of 44 on the Beck Depression Inventory was consistent 
with extremely severe depression. Likewise, the patient's scale for disturbed thinking on 
the MMPI was off the chart, as were three other standard clinical scales on the MMPI. 
She endorsed many symptoms of schizophrenia (Sc scale of the MMPI) but she does not 
have schizophrenia. 
In a case like this, symptom inventories like the ones used by Dr. Card are of very 
questionable validity. 
Kirton & McConkie 
Re: Tenne Straub 
(3) 
Dr. Card's report focuses on the diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD). The standard symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder overlap significantly 
with a broad range of symptoms of depression and anxiety. Anxiety is well known to be 
a complication of depression and a deteriorating life. The patient had many unfortunate 
events in her life after December 15, 1993, which are well known to be associated with 
depression. When patients are depressed, they typically have sleep disturbance and bad 
dreams. Tenne described her bad dreams as typically associated with negative events 
which would occur in the course of a day. Understandably, when she was depressed she 
had some dreams about the incident in question about which she felt guilty. Guilty 
feelings associated with depression typically produce ruminations, thoughts and dreams 
about negative events in the past." She reported that the dreams about the incident in 
question had improved, whereas the depressive symptoms continued to worsen. Dr. 
Card's report does not address her personal problems and severe depression caused by 
those problems. The report does not explain her extreme exaggeration of symptoms in 
so many diagnostic categories. Furthermore, he fails to explain the fact that Ms. Straub 
worked for over eight months after the incident at the hospital. 
Dr. Card makes some effort to refute the notion of malingering. My diagnosis did 
not include malingering. If I had thought the patient were malingering, I would have 
diagnosed malingering. It is a fact, however, that her responses on the MMPI, when 
studied by way of a number of standard methods developed by psychiatrists, were similar 
to persons who are believed to be malingerers. I believe this simply reflects the patient's 
personality style of general exaggeration of distress. I do not believe she was malingering 
her depression and unhappiness. 
In summary, Tenne Straub is a woman with clinical depression who has endorsed 
a broad range of symptoms. She has many personal problems. There was a very long 
delay before she identified the incident at the hospital as a problem. In her answers to 
interrogatories as well as in her deposition, Ms. Straub does not relate quitting her job at 
.McKay-Dee Hospital to the incident of December 15, 1993. The evidence does not 
support a causal connection between the incident and the patient's present emotional 
disturbance. 
Yours truly, 
David L. McCann, M.D. 
DLM/vr 
Exhibit D 
Pertinent Statutes 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT 34A-2-601 
PART 6 
MEDICAL EVALUATIONS 
34A-2-601. Medical panel — Medical director or medical 
consultants — Discretionary authority of Divi-
sion of Adjudication to refer case — Findings 
and reports — Objections to report — Hearing — 
Expenses. 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or 
for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if the 
employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the Division of Adjudi-
cation may refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel 
appointed by an administrative law judge. 
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due 
to an occupational disease is filed with the Division of Adjudication, an 
administrative law judge shall, except upon stipulation of all parties, 
appoint an impartial medical panel. 
(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more physicians specializing 
in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim. 
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evalu-
ation of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the division may 
employ a medical director or medical consultants on a full-time or 
part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical evidence and 
advising an administrative law judge with respect to the administrative 
law judge's ultimate fact-finding responsibility. 
(e) If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or medical 
consultants, the medical director or medical consultants shall be allowed 
to function in the same manner and under the same procedures as 
required of a medical panel. 
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make such study, take such X-rays, and perform such tests, including 
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the administrative law judge, 
as it may determine to be necessary or desirable. 
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make: 
(i) a report in writing to the administrative law judge in a form 
prescribed by the Division of Adjudication; and 
(ii) additional findings as the administrative law judge may re-
quire. 
(c) In occupational disease cases, in addition to the requirements of 
Subsection (2)(b), the panel shall certify to the administrative law judge: 
(i) the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from perform-
ing work for remuneration or profit: 
(ii) whether the sole cause of the disability or death, in the opinion 
of the panel, results from the occupational disease: and 
(iii) whether any other causes have aggravated, prolonged, accel-
erated, or in any way contributed to the disability or death, and if so, 
the extent in percentage to which the other causes have so contrib-
uted. 
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(d) (i) The administrative law judge shall promptly distribute full 
copies of the report by certified mail with return receipt requested to: 
(A) the applicant; 
(B) the employer; and 
(C) the employer's insurance carrier. 
(ii) Within 15 days after the report is deposited in the United States 
post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insurance carrier may 
file with the administrative law judge written objections to the report. 
(iii) If no written objections are filed within that period, the report 
is considered admitted in evidence. 
(e) The administrative law judge may base the administrative law 
judge's finding and decision on the report of the panel, medical director, or 
medical consultants, but is not bound by the report if other substantial 
conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary finding. 
(f) (i) If objections to the report are filed, the administrative law judge 
may set the case for hearing to determine the facts and issues 
involved. 
(ii) At the hearing, any party so desiring may request the admin-
istrative law judge to have the chair of the medical panel, the medical 
director, or the medical consultants present at the hearing for exami-
nation and cross-examination. 
< iii) For good cause shown, the administrative law judge may order 
other members of the panel, with or without the chair or the medical 
director or medical consultants, to be present at the hearing for 
examination and cross-examination. 
(g) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical con-
sultants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be 
considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the 
testimony admitted. 
(h) For any claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, 
medical director, or medical consultant before July 1, 1997, the commis-
sion shall pay out of the Employers Reinsurance Fund established in 
Section 34A-2-702: 
(i) expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical 
director, or medical consultant; and 
(ii) the expenses of the panel's, director's, or consultant's appear-
ance before the administrative law judge. 
(i) For any claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, 
medical director, or medical consultant on or after July 1, 1997, the 
commission shall pay out of the Uninsured Employers' Fund established 
in Section 34A-2-704: 
(i» the expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, 
medical director, or medical consultant: and 
iii) the expenses of the panel's, director's, or consultant's appear-
ance before the administrative law judge. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 52, $ 1: C. 1943, ch. 240, § 173; 1997, ch. 45, * 1; renum-
Supp., 42-1-71.10; L. 1955, ch. 57, $ 1; 1969, bered by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 138. 
ch. 86, * 9; 1979, ch. 138, * 6; 1982, ch. 41, Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
§ 1; 1988, ch. 116, } 7; 1991, ch. 136, * 13; ment, effective May 2, 1994, deleted "m its sole 
1994, ch. 224. * 7; renumbered by L. 1996, discretion" following "commission" in the first 
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(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report o: 
the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by the 
report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a 
contrary finding. 
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the case 
for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing, any 
party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman of the 
medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants present at 
the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good cause 
shown, the commission may order other members of the panel, with or 
without the chairman or the medical director or medical consultants, to be 
present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. 
(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical consult-
ants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be 
considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the 
testimony admitted. 
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical 
director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance 
before the commission shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 52, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 42-1-71.10; L. 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1969, 
ch. 86, § 9; 1979, ch. 138, § 6; 1982, ch. 41, 
§ 1; 1988, ch. 116, § 7; 1991, ch. 136, § 13; 
1994, ch. 224, § 7. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted the 
first "and" for "or" in Subsection (l)(a) and 
deleted the former second sentence, which read 
"The panel shall have the qualifications gener-
ANALYSIS 
Duty of commission on remand of case. 
Effect of 1982 amendment. 
Function of medical panel. 
Objections to report. 
Panel report as evidence. 
Qualifications of panel members. 
Referral to panel. 
—Discretion. 
Report, statements, and admissions. 
Supplemental award. 
Cited. 
Duty of commission on remand of case. 
Where an order of the commission was va-
cated and the cause remanded because of a 
deficiency in the evidence to support the report 
of a medical panel appointed by the commis-
sion, the commission was not required to make 
an award based solely on the plaintiff's evi-
dence; but it was the responsibility of the com-
mission to make some disposition of plaintiffs 
application for an award and it was the pre-
aily applicable to the medical panel under Sec-
tion 35-2-56"; added Subsections (l)(b) and (c) 
and redesignated former Subsection (1Kb) as 
(l)(dV, and added the second sentence in Sub-
section (2Kb). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
deleted "in its sole discretion" following "com-
mission" in the first sentence in Subsection 
(l)(d) and substituted "certified" for "registered" 
in the first sentence in Subsection (2)(c). 
rogative of the commission to make a determi-
nation upon the evidence in the light of the 
decision of the Supreme Court or to order and 
hold a supplemental hearing to allow the par-
ties to present additional evidence. Hackford v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 250, 364 P.2d 
1091 (1961). 
Effect of 1982 amendment. 
The 1982 amendment of this section, making 
the granting of a hearing discretionary, does 
not enlarge or destroy vested or contractual 
rights; rather, it governs the process under 
which claims are disposed of by the commis-
sion. Moore v. American Coal Co., 737 P.2d 989 
(Utah 1987'; Ortiz v. Industrial Comm'n, 766 
P.2d 1092 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
This section is procedural and may be applied 
to an accident that occurred before the 1982 
amendments. Ortiz v. Industrial Comm'n, 766 
P.2d 1092 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Function of medical panel. 
It is the function of the medical panel to give 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 99 C.J S. Workmen's Compensation 
§ 292. 
35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical 
consultants — Discretionary authority of com-
mission to refer case — Findings and reports — 
Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses. 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensationforinjiiry by accident, or 
for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if the 
employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may 
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the 
commission. 
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due 
to an occupational disease is filed with the commission, the commission 
shall, except upon stipulation of all parties, appoint an impartial medical 
panel. 
(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more physicians specializing 
in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim. 
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evalu-
ation of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission may 
employ a medical director or medical consultants on a full-time or 
part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical evidence and 
advising the commission with respect to its ultimate fact-finding respon-
sibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or medical 
consultants, they shall be allowed to function in the same manner and 
under the same procedures as required of a medical panel. 
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make such study, take such X-rays, and perform such tests, including 
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as it may 
determine to be necessary or desirable. 
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the 
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission 
may require. In occupational disease cases, the panel shall certify to the 
commission the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from 
performing work for remuneration or profit, and whether the sole cause of 
the disability or death, in the opinion of the panel, results from the 
occupational disease and whether any other causes have aggravated, 
prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to the disability or 
death, and if so, the extent in percentage to which the other causes have 
so contributed. 
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report to 
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by certified mail 
with return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited 
in the United States post office, the applicant, the employer, or its 
insurance carrier may file with the commission written objections to the 
report. If no written objections are filed within that period, the report is 
considered admitted in evidence. 
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(c) All records on appeals shall be maintained by the Division of 
Adjudication The records shall include an appeal docket showing the 
receipt and disposition of the appeals 
(4) A party in interest shall be given notice of the entry of a presiding 
officer's order or any order or award ot the commission The mailing of the copy 
of the order or award to the last-known address in the files of the commission 
of a party in interest and to the attorneys or agents of record in the case, if any, 
is considered to be notice of the order 
(5) In any formal adjudicative proceeding, the presiding officer may take 
any action permitted under Section 63-46b-8 
History C 1953, 34A-1-302, enacted bv L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1997 ch 375, § 
1997, ch. 375, ^ 65. 328 makes the act effective on July 1 1997 
34A-1-303. Review of administrative decision. 
(1) A decision entered by an administrative law judge under this title is the 
final order of the commission unless a further appeal is initiated under this 
title and in accordance with the rules of the commission governing the review. 
(2) (a) Unless otherwise provided, a person who is entitled to appeal a 
decision of an administrative law judge under this title, may appeal the 
decision by filing a motion for review with the Division of Adjudication. 
(bj Unless a party in interest to the appeal requests in accordance with 
Subsection C3) that the appeal be heard by the Appeals Board, the 
commissioner shall hear the review in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 
J-6b, Administrative Procedures Act A decision of the commissioner is a 
final order of the commission unless set aside by the court of appeals 
(c) (i) If in accordance with Subsection (3) a party m interest to the 
appeal requests that the appeal be neard by the Appeals Board, the 
Appeals Board shall hear the review m accordance with 
(A) Section 34A-1-205, and 
(B) Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act 
(n) A decision of the Appeals Board is a final order of the commis-
sion unless set aside by the court of appeals 
(3) A party in interest may request that an appeal be heard by the Appeals 
Board by filing the request with the Division of Adjudication 
(a) as part of the motion for review, or 
(b) if requested by a party in interest who did not file a motion for 
review, within 20 days of the date the motion for review is filed with the 
Division of Adjudication 
(4) (a) On appeal, the commissioner or the Appeals Board may 
d) affirm the decision of an administrative law judge, 
(n) modify the decision of an administrative law judge, 
(in) return the case to an administrative law judge for further 
action as directed, or 
(iv) reverse the findings, conclusions, and decision of an adminis-
trative law judge 
(b; The commissioner or Appeals Board may not conduct a trial de novo 
of the case 
(c) The commissioner or Appeals Board may base its decision on: 
d) the evidence previously submitted in the case, or 
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(ii) on written argument or written supplemental evidence re-
quested by the commissioner or Appeals Board. 
(d) The commissioner or Appeals Board may permit the parties to: 
(i) file briefs or other papers; or 
(ii) conduct oral argument. 
(e) The commissioner or Appeals Board shall promptly notify the 
parties to any proceedings before it of its decision, including its findings 
and conclusions. 
(5) (a) A member of the Appeals Board may not participate in any case in 
which the member is an interested party. Each decision of a member of the 
Appeals Board shall represent the member's independent judgment. 
(b) If a member of the Appeals Board may not participate j n a case 
because the member is an interested party, the two members of the 
Appeals Board that may hear the case shall assign an individual to 
participate as a member of the board in that case if the individual: 
(i) is not a interested party in the case; and 
(ii) was not previously assigned to preside over any proceeding or 
take any administrative action related to the case. 
(6) If an order is appealed to the court of appeals after the party appealing 
the order has exhausted all administrative appeals, the court of appeals has 
jurisdiction to: 
(a) review, reverse, remand, or annul any order of the commissioner or 
Appeals Board; or 
(b) suspend or delay the operation or execution of the order of the 
commissioner or Appeals Board being appealed. 
History: C. 1953, 34A-1-303, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 375, § 
1997, ch. 375, § 66. 328 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Change of theory on appeal. 
Conditions precedent to review. 
Decisions reviewable. 
Issues on appeal. 
Standard of review. 
Change of theory on appeal. 
The rule that parties cannot try a case on one 
theory and then attempt to gain a reversal 
upon some other theory on appeal, not ad-
vanced on the trial, probably should not be 
applied as strictly to appeals under the Work-
men's Compensation Act. Stanley v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 79 Utah 228. 8 P.2d 770 (1932). 
Conditions precedent to review. 
Where a claimant accepts compensation sug-
gested by commission and agreed to by insur-
ance carrier, but without formal hearing, there 
is no award to review. Johnson v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 93 Utah 493, 73 P.2d 1308 (1937). 
Decisions reviewable. 
Only a final decision of the commission 
awarding or denying compensation is subject to 
review. Utah Consol. Mining Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 66 Utah 173. 240 P. 440 (1925). 
An interlocutory order of the commission 
denying employer's motion to dismiss on 
ground of res judicata was not reviewable. Utah 
Consol. Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 66 
Utah 173. 240 P. 440 (1925). 
Issues on appeal. 
Claim that the Industrial Commission em-
ployed the wrong standard of proof could not 
have been raised until after the Commission 
had made its review. Thus, the claim was 
properly before the appellate court even though 
it was raised for the first time on judicial 
review. Ashcrott v. Industrial Comm'n, 855 P.2d 
267 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 
95 (Utah 1993). 
Standard of review. 
In reviewing interpretations of general ques-
tions of law. appellate court applies a correc-
tion-of-error standard, with no deference to the 
expertise of the commission. Board of Educ. v. 
Olsen. 684 P.2d 49 (Utah 1984). 
Administrative determination that indi-
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